In recent decades, progress in the field of neurosciences has triggered an interest in understanding mind-brain relationships. Quantum Mechanics (QM) has been present in the debate from its beginnings through the well-known measurement paradox. The standard interpretation of QM considers two basic, fundamentally irreducible, processes: the deterministic evolution of the wave-function according to the Schrödinger equation, once the initial conditions have been settled; and the indeterministic wave-function collapse into one of the possible outcomes, after performing a specific measurement. So, QM would point to the limits of a purely deterministic view of nature and, in particular, of brains. Nevertheless, QM's relevance for the brain's physics is still to be proven. Detractors of the QM influence are confident of the role of decoherent processes at different physical scales in order to ensure a classical deterministic behavior of the brain. However, little attention is paid to the epistemic implications of invoking decoherence for the mind-brain problem. In this paper, (i) we present lasting QM models stating a specific view of human consciousness and make explicit their position regarding the relationship between the physical activity of neurons and/or networks of neurons and the phenomenal conscious experience; (ii) we review the main criticisms of the relevance of QM in the brain and, most importantly, we bring out the philosophical implications behind the usual recourse to decoherence in the transition from the quantum to the classical world, explaining why the mind-brain problem and the measurement paradox should not be disentangled.
Introduction 1
During the last few years, the field of neuroscience has received increasing attention due to empirical and theoretical progress in the understanding of the brain. The dream of attaining a definitive scientific view of the relationship between mind and brain in humans no longer seems unreachable after the experimental evidence presented by Libet and others, which makes it seem as if the consciousness of making a decision comes late in the sequence of physiological events leading to an action (Smith, 2009) . In close connection with this, the problem of the ontological status of free will continues to generate substantial discussion among neuroscientists and philosophers (Smith, 2011) .
The search for the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) is ongoing and unresolved. It presupposes that consciousness is the outcome of systems of neurons working together in unison (Smith, 2009) . The classical neurobiologists' research plan is to find neurons or subcircuits of interconnected neurons whose rate and manner of firing, when above some threshold, correlate with conscious experiences. Then any theory of consciousness will have to explain why some but, critically, not all firings are NCC (Kauffman, 2008) . In this context, cognitive neuroscientists and neurobiologists consider the quantum world to be irrelevant to their concerns (Koch & Hepp, 2006) ; even though brains must obey QM, they do not seem to exploit any of its special features. The neuroscience of the brain is seemingly within the classical physics that considers a system, however complicated, to be ultimately capable of instantiation by a classical computer (Smith 2009 ). According to this widespread view, living systems obey physical laws and this is in contradiction with the idea of making free conscious choices. These simply reflect the chemical makeup of the individual at the time of decision. Therefore, a belief in free will would be nothing other than a continuing belief in vitalism (Cashmore, 2010) .
Of course, the complexity of the brain makes it rather difficult to establish a physical theory about its workings. Nevertheless, determinist chaos has offered a good standard to model neurodynamics (Freeman, 1979; Amit, 1989) . This has been of increasing influence over the years, and today there is general agreement that chaotic processes play an important role in helping us to understand the dynamics of the brain at various levels. Cognitive science and psychology have adopted this idea (Atmanspacher & Rotter, 2008) . Within this framework, only a small subset of neurons are responsible for conscious experience, while infinitesimal alterations in initial conditions lead to divergent trajectories in phase space that provoke the illusion of free will (Kauffman, 2009) . As proponents of the computational mind, deterministic chaos in the brain, and consciousness as an illusion, see (Dennett, 1991; Churchland & Sejnowski, 1992; Crick, 1994; Rees et al., 2002) .
As physicist Anton Zeilinger puts it, "biologists' essential paradigm is that we are essentially classical machines" (Abbott et al., 2008) . Thought is matter and thinking is matter in coordinated motion. Thought arises as a low-dimensional, coherent pattern in an extremely high-dimensional system called the human being coupled to its world, where the slightest fluctuation can trigger a thought (Kelso, 2008) . According to the principles of classical physical theory, consciousness makes no difference in behavior: all behavior is determined by microscopic causation without ever acknowledging the existence of consciousness. Philosophers who accept the ideas of classical physics must conclude that conscious experiences are either identical to the corresponding classically describable activities of the brain, or emergent properties (Stapp, 2001) . Thus the mind-brain identity theory asserts that mental states, "qualia", are literally identical to specific neural states. This is currently the most acceptable philosophical view of consciousness and the basis of most neurobiological research on consciousness (Kauffman, 2008) .
Obviously, things are not straightforward from the methodological point of view. Neuroscience finds it hard to identify the (alleged) crucial link existing between empirical studies, which are described in psychological terms, and the data that arise, which are instead described in neurophysiological terms (Conte et al., 2009) . In other words, even the correlation between physical and mental states is unclear. In order to establish that correlation, one needs an objective account of the other person's state of consciousness. But can we do this without imprecision? How do we know the other person's state of consciousness unless she makes it clear? In fact, there is ongoing discussion about a range of general methodological problems with introspective methods and subjective reports to investigate and measure consciousness (Irvine, 2012) .
The mind-brain identity theory has also received criticisms due to the insufficiency of chaos tools to grasp the essence of the complexity of life in the operations of the vertebrate brain (Freeman et al., 2001) , and on account of a deep flaw in computational theory, namely its notion of "information" as pre-given and context-free. Because of the algorithmic nature of the computational mind, its functionality depends on a framework that specifies the information that can be received as input. This artificial constraint freezes the mind-world relation: on one side it attributes inherent functional identities to structures that comprise our "cognitive architecture," and on the other side it reduces the role of context to a set of pre-specified informational stimuli (Barrett, 2010 ).
Yet the most profound critiques of the mind-brain identity theory stem from what is known as the "hard problem" (Chalmers, 1995) : the question of how the physical activity of neurons is "converted" into the phenomenal conscious experience and subjective feelings which we live through (Smith, 2009; Penrose & Hameroff, 2011) . The problem is that the mechanism by which the brain generates thoughts and feelings remains unknown, since the calculation alone cannot explain why we have feelings, awareness and "inner life" (Pregnolato, 2010) . The existence of the defining experiential characteristics of consciousness in a brain does not follow rationally from a classical physics model of the brain (Stapp, 2001; Kauffman, 2008) . No feature, configuration, or activity of the physical world, as it is conceived of and described in classical physics, is the experiential quality that characterizes our conscious thoughts, ideas, and feelings.
Consciousness is completely unexplained by classical means and something beyond the classically conceived physical world seems to be needed in the full inventory of what exists (Stapp, 2008; Abbott et al., 2008) . The mind-brain problem is thus narrowly connected to our way of understanding nature.
In contrast, the shift from classical to quantum physics along the last century brought the mind back into the scientific world. Reference to QM in the mind-brain problem is as old as its very foundations and the Copenhagen interpretation, because QM could offer a new way of looking at the mind-brain relations (Section 2). Yet, while one may find in the literature different reviews about the theories applying QM to the problem of consciousness (Vannini, 2008; Smith, 2009; Atmanspacher, 2011) , little is said regarding their philosophical classification as bottom-up or top-down causality models. In this article, we wish to introduce foremost QM approaches to the mind-brain problem according to the following criterion: whether consciousness might be explained as a result of some quantum process or consciousness is irreducible to physics, as the QM measurement paradox might eventually manifest (Section 3). Even if the role of QM in the brain according to some empirical and theoretical estimates is highly controversial (Section 4), the main criticisms rest upon the pervasive process of decoherence (Section 5). Since some scholars have claimed that QM is not necessary to understand consciousness (Thomsen, 2008) , or vice versa (Yu & Nikolić, 2011) , we shall then discuss the philosophical implications behind the usual recourse to decoherence in the transition from the quantum to the classical world, and explain why the mind-brain problem and the measurement paradox cannot currently be disentangled (Section 6 and Conclusions).
2. Why Quantum Mechanics could be relevant As our total classical world is grounded in the QM realm, so are brains and the processes they implement. For instance, quantum theory is needed to explain the states of ions in the selectivity filter and the function of ion channels in neurons (Salari et al. 2011; Summhammer 2012) . There can be no reasonable doubt that quantum events occur and are efficacious in the brain as elsewhere in the material world. But it is controversial whether these events are efficacious and relevant for those aspects of the brain that are correlated with mental activity: quantum effects need not necessarily be directly responsible for the generation of conscious perceptions (Thomsen, 2008; Atmanspacher, 2011) . From the theoretical point of view, Planck's constant is an extremely tiny number on the scale of human events, and one would deem the classical approximation a good one for dealing with the brain. However, QM involves subtle non-local entanglement of physical quantities with possibly macroscopic manifestations-think about superconductivity, superfluidity, Bose-Einstein condensation, or changes in the bulk magnetic susceptibility (Ghosh et al., 2003) . A universal criterion for getting rid of those effects remains elusive-in terms of the Schrödinger's cat paradox, we have no well-defined limit for "cattiness"-and quantum theory should not be easily neglected.
More interestingly, extending seminal work by Lucas (1961) , Roger Penrose has argued that certain aspects of human consciousness, such as understanding the truth of a specific mathematical proposition, must be beyond the scope of any computational system (Penrose, 1989; 2004) . Noncomputability is a well-defined mathematical concept, but it had not previously been considered as a serious possibility for the result of physical actions. The argument that conscious thought, whatever other attributes it may also have, is non-computable (as follows from certain deductions from Gödel's incompleteness theorem) would imply that at least some conscious states cannot be derived from previous states by an algorithmic process (Hameroff & Penrose, 1996; 2011) . Then, electrochemical neural networks are fundamentally incapable of generating some aspects of cognition, and the basis for our current neuroscientific understanding of intelligence would be undermined . Within this scientific conundrum, QM could be important since it contains nonalgorithmic elements and is the only pure and fundamental source of randomness in our current understanding of physical nature (Eagle, 2013) . It has also been argued that if consciousness is partially quantum mechanical, the problems of causal closure of the brain, free will, mental causation, and mental experiences might have a solution (Kauffman, 2008; . QM would allow for a different "a-causal" interaction of free will and the physical brain.
On the other hand, quantum coherence seems to be a plausible mechanism for the efficiency and coordination exhibited by biological systems, providing a conceptual bridge between the physico-chemical organization of living beings and the phenomenal states of life and experience (Salari et al., 2011) . For example, consciousness does not seem to be spatially localized to any part of the brain, yet subjectively feels like a coherent entity. QM might account for such holistic effects that thwart a purely local analysis, by introducing fundamentally non-local degrees of freedom. Naturally, non-local degrees of freedom can be found in classical systems at higher levels of complexity. But these are not generally taken to be fundamental in a classical ontology, as they are inevitably tied to an observer's shortcomings in terms of resolution (Hagan et al., 2002) .
The essential non-computability of QM and the mind-brain problem are related through the well-known measurement paradox. In the standard QM interpretation we have basically two distinct processes:
(i) the deterministic and unitary evolution of the wave-function according to the Schrödinger equation, once the initial conditions have been established; and (ii) the indeterministic and non-unitary wave-function collapse after a measurement into one of the possible outcomes regarding that specific measurement (then becoming an actual event), with a probability given by the square amplitude of this possible outcome before the measurement.
How can the discontinuous and probabilistic wave-function collapse come about as a result of the interaction (measurement) between two parts of the physical reality? This is the QM measurement problem or paradox. The wave-function collapse is in its essence unpredictable and also non-computable. In this it resembles the non-computable nature of consciousness (Penrose, 1994) . Hence for Penrose, devices capable of "multiplying-up" this collapse are good candidates for the physical basis of consciousness (Smith, 2009 ).
This description involves something even more far-reaching for the problem of conscious free will. The specific measurements to be made are not determined by the theory and in practical applications are treated as free input variables. The numbers that occur in classical physics represent the internal properties of some physical system, whereas the action that replaces such numbers in QM represents a probing action performed upon that physical system by an observing system external to it. That is, a number that in classical physics represents an internal property of a physical system, with no implicit or explicit reference to anything external to that physical system, is replaced in QM by an element that represents an action performed upon that system by a system that is probing it. As a consequence, the quantum generalization of classical mechanical laws does not by itself generate a dynamically complete deterministic physical theory. It has a causal gap. Something else is needed to complete the dynamics (Stapp, 2005) . While the Schrödinger equation perfectly fits into a classical objective account, the occurrence of actual events requires a non-computable, nondeterministic process carried out by a physical measuring system: an observer. Orthodox QM interpretation irreducibly mingles an objective and a subjective account of reality. Along QM's history, more radical perspectives were opened within this interpretative framework. London and Bauer (London & Bauer, 1939) proposed that it is indeed human consciousness which completes quantum measurement, attributing to the "creative action of consciousness" the crucial role in understanding quantum measurement. Wigner (1967) followed up on this proposal. But, some years before, von Neumann (1955) was able to show that the assumed boundary separating the observing instrument and the socalled observed system can be arbitrarily shifted and, ultimately, the observer becomes the "abstract ego" (in Von Neumann's terms) of the observer (Manousakis, 2006; Atmanspacher, 2011) . Von Neumann makes it clear that he is trying to tie together the subjective perceptual and objective physical aspects of nature. As a matter of fact, his theory is essentially a theory of the interaction of subjective realities with an evolving objective physical universe (Stapp, 2001) .
In summary, the wave-function collapse is asserted to be accompanied by the occurrence in the agent's stream of consciousness of the experience associated with the chosen measurement. The agent thereby acquires knowledge (Stapp, 2005) . QM includes the description of some effects that cannot be ascribed to physical origin alone, but also include our mental activity. It is at once a description of physical reality and a theory about human knowledge, as Heisenberg strongly emphasized (Stapp, 2008) . Thus quantum theory has come to be a theory about human cognition. The orthodox QM interpretation is essentially subjective and epistemological, because the basic reality of the theory is "our knowledge" (Stapp, 2001) . In this situation, it is necessary to ascertain whether QM in its current form has some scientific prediction for manifestations of mental realities in the brain, or is in itself a still incomplete theory of physical reality which will eventually explain consciousness. We define the latter possibility as "bottom-up" and the former as "top-down" quantum consciousness in our classification of the present theories involving QM in the brain.
3. Current theories involving QM in the conscious brain Before referring to the main candidates for a quantum theory of consciousness, it is mandatory to say some words about a current line of research that uses the QM mathematical formalism for describing human conscious and behavioral phenomena. There are generalized approaches addressing purely mental phenomena using formal quantum features, such as non-commuting operations or nonBoolean logic, but without involving the fullfledged framework of QM. Some of the working groups are listed in (Atmanspacher, 2011) ; see, e.g., (Conte, 2008; Conte et al., 2009; Pothos & Busemeyer, 2012) .
Undoubtedly, QM formalism has the potentiality to fit some of the deviations of classical probability laws involved in mental activities. But this procedure has been criticized as ambiguous. It is possible that classical probabilistic models, with different assumptions, fit the experimental results equally well (Thomsen, 2008) . The direct application of QM formalism to mental states allows for valuable statistical fitting of many empirical data, but does not eventually tell us anything about the underlying reality causing those mental phenomena (Atmanspacher, 2011) . However, it might provide a clear-cut result of the relevance of QM for the whole mind-brain issue, inasmuch as it is able to show the inability of classical theory to explain the available results.
Bottom-up
quantum-consciousness theories Along the history of QM, physicists like Hiroomi Umezawa and Kunio Yasue, mathematicians like Roger Penrose and biomedical investigators like Stuart Hameroff, Gordon Globus and Gustav Bernroider have plumbed the depths of subatomic structure and its macroscopic amplifications in search of substrates for quantum effects that may match attributes of the human psyche better than models advocated by conventional cognitive neuroscience (Pregnolato, 2010) . Now, we shall focus on the main representatives of this school of thought, still active.
Hameroff-Penrose's Orchestrated Objective Reduction (OOR)
The best known of bottom-up quantum consciousness proposals is Penrose and Hameroff's hypothesis that the tubulin components of microtubules, filamentous protein polymers that form the cytoskeleton of neurons, implement quantum computations (Hameroff & Penrose, 1996; 2011; Koch & Hepp, 2006; Vannini, 2008; Atmanspacher, 2011 ). Penrose's rationale for invoking QM is not that randomness offers room for mental causation to become efficacious. His conceptual starting point is that the emergence of a conscious act is a process which cannot be described algorithmically (Atmanspacher, 2011) . Hameroff realized that Penrose's ideas about consciousness' non-computability could complement his own work on microtubules, wherein tubulins would be used to embed Penrose's theoretical framework neurophysiologically. Tubulin states are assumed to depend on quantum events, so that quantum coherence among different tubulins is possible (Smith, 2009; Abbott et al., 2008; Atmanspacher, 2011) .
Each tubulin dimer can exist in two superposed conformations, with each corresponding wave-function having its own space-time geometry. When the "separation" of these two geometries reaches a critical amount (related to quantum gravity), objective reduction (OR) into one or other of the states must occur (Hameroff & Penrose, 1996) . The pre-OR, coherent superposition of tubulin states is then considered as a pre-conscious process, while each instantaneous (and noncomputable) OR, or self-collapse, is a discrete event of proto-consciousness. Consciousness arises significantly only when the alternative states are part of some highly organized structure, so that such manifestations of OR occur in an extremely orchestrated form. The OOR schema proposes that quantum states can extend by tunneling, leading to entanglement between adjacent neurons through gap junctions via the activation of microtubuleassociated proteins (Smith, 2009 ).
It must be already said that the OOR model has received a good number of criticisms, see, e.g., (Koch & Hepp, 2006; Smith, 2009 ), and we can add that it is unclear in what sense OOR is not effectively random and why and how the wave-function's objective reduction is orchestrated. Obviously, a full-blown theory of quantum gravity would be required to ultimately understand quantum measurement (Atmanspacher, 2011) . Hameroff-Penrose have answered critics on scientific grounds (Penrose & Hameroff, 2011) . Nevertheless, it is worth noting here a philosophical point raised by Smith: Why should the OOR be associated with a conscious moment? There seems to be no very obvious answer. Smith deems HameroffPenrose to be in the vicinity of the age-old fallacy of "post hoc ergo propter hoc" (Smith, 2009 ). Yet this fallacy does not apply when we are faced by only two basic possibilities for nature today: either classical and deterministic or quantum and indeterministic. The correlation among consciousness, noncomputability and QM offers a hint on where to look for a solution, and Hameroff-Penrose must be credited on that account.
More
importantly, the proposed connection between consciousness and wavefunction reduction in the OOR model is almost opposite to the idea that had frequently been put forward in the early days of QM, which suggests that a quantum measurement is something that occurs only as a result of the conscious intervention of an observer (Penrose & Hameroff, 2011) . Self-organization of quantum information would be able to generate self-awareness and even space-time itself. Because of that, according to this theory, consciousness is not a phenomenon exclusive to humans, but belongs to each particle in this universe (Pregnolato, 2010) . Hameroff-Penrose thus takes the correlation between wavefunction reduction and consciousness to its very limit. They turn over von Neumann's stipulation (conscious measurement causes quantum reduction). Now it is the other way round: OOR of the biological state-vector causes the appearance of consciousness. In this sense, they just assume that consciousness arises via OOR in the passage from a coherent to a reduced wave-function. So they are describing a possible new physical process involved in the emergence of consciousnessperhaps as its substrate-without explaining its specificity (Searle, 1997) . Their view is bottomup because consciousness would emerge from nature in a way that is not yet well understood.
Kauffman's Decohering-Recohering Brain
In his last years of research, the theoretical biologist Stuart Kauffman has embraced the hypothesis of the quantum mind in a slightly different manner from Hameroff-Penrose-to whom he acknowledges credit for legitimizing the problem of consciousness in serious scientific discussion. According to Kauffman, the emergence of consciousness in a classically computational brain is not possible. The mind would be a quantum coherent-reversibly decohering-recohering system in the brain. The essence of Kauffman's hypothesis is the (alleged) reversibility of the process from coherent to decoherent-classical, and from this to recoherent quantum states again. The brain undergoes such reversible transformations all the time (Kauffman, 2009) . As open thermodynamic systems, into which energy and information can flow, cells might have evolved the ability to maintain coherent or near coherent behavior. Kauffman envisions the formation and reformation of percolating webs of coherent electron transport within the cell, thanks to the changing ordered water molecules connecting proteins, always with some coherence remaining. These percolating webs could eventually reach the millisecond time scale, typical of conscious events (Kauffman, 2008) .
Remarkably enough, Kauffman considers his model a variant of the mind-brain identity theory because of what he calls "acausal mind influence". According to this, the mind would eventually have consequences without having to act by a physically efficient cause on brain. A partially quantum coherent theory of consciousness, coupled with a mindbrain identity thesis, could allow mental experiences to have consequences on actual happenings in the physical world without invoking spooky mental causes of physical events. Mind acts a-causally on material world via quantum decoherence, and acts on mind itself via the decohering-recohering dynamical behavior of the mind-brain identity system (Kauffman, 2008; . On the other hand, Kauffman assumes that even if his hypothesis is correct, the "neural code" and the binding problem persist. But more significantly, he recognizes that his model makes no eventual progress at all on the more fundamental issue of qualia, because we do not know what understanding consciousness is (from the mind-brain identity theory viewpoint). His theory is no answer, at least as yet, to the hard problem (Kauffman, 2008) . In spite of Kauffman's big effort to maintain a quantum understanding of consciousness, his proposal remains ambiguous from the philosophical perspective. This ambiguity stems from the more fundamental problem of understanding the relationship between consciousness and the physical process of quantum decoherence: whether consciousness generates decoherence, or the latter produces the former. But at present, neither Kauffman nor anyone else knows in detail how quantum decoherence or the wave-function collapse takes place.
Vitiello's Dissipative Quantum Brain
A different approach to the quantum brain was initiated in the sixties by Umezawa and coworkers, embedded in the framework of quantum field theory (QFT). In this model, the brain is considered as a many-particle system undergoing continuous phase transitions, which only QFT can account for. In the 1990s, Vitiello and collaborators developed the QFT dissipative formulation of the brain dynamics (Vitiello, 1995; 2004; Globus, 2009; Pregnolato, 2010) . The basic idea is to conceive of memory states in terms of vacuum states of quantum fields (Atmanspacher, 2011) , which are identified as the electric dipole vibrational modes of the water molecules. These fields affect the neural system developing correlations and order which can extend to the macroscopic levels (Vannini, 2008) . In this sense, we would be facing macroscopic quantum processes characterized by a coherent dynamics (Freeman et al., 2012) , even though neurons and glia cells are deemed to be classical objects.
Phase transitions among unitary inequivalent vacua occur due to coupling with the environment. So, dual modes of degrees of freedom (brain and environment) are involved. Whenever they match, the imaginary dualities become a real unity. The unity of phenomenal consciousness is between-two. Actually, Vitiello locates consciousness in the vacuum state because consciousness is between system and its environment, indeed consciousness is their belonging-together. Consciousness is literally a "creation of the between-two" (Vitiello, 2004; Globus, 2009) . From the physiological point of view, the activation of a neuronal assemblyinitiated by external stimuli-is necessary to make the encoded content of the memory consciously accessible (Atmanspacher, 2011) . In this manner, the recall process implies the excitation of dipolar wave quanta of a nature similar to the ones producing the memory printing process. When the former are excited, the brain would "consciously" feel the ordered pattern in the ground state (Vitiello, 1995) . It is the dynamics of the populations in each sensory cortex that organizes the microscopic fragments into meaningful knowledge-which subjectively we experience as thoughts and perceptions-by creating macroscopic vector fields of activity that organize hundreds of millions of neurons and trillions of synapses (Freeman et al., 2012) .
From a philosophical standpoint, according to Vitiello, there would be no conflict between the subjectiveness of the first person experience of consciousness and the objectiveness of the external world. Objectiveness of the external world is the primary, necessary condition for "openness", for dissipation out of which both consciousness and unidirectional flow of time may exist. Thus, it would make no sense to refer to the "subject" as something pre-existing the relationship with the environment. The "one", the subject, is the action, the evolutive and never repeating play, their entre-deux. This is the meaning of the quantum entanglement between brain and environment (Vitiello, 2004) . Vitiello concludes that consciousness derives from the constant interaction of the brain with its double, which is the environment (Vannini, 2008) . Hence the property that most clearly distinguishes biological intelligence from contemporary machine intelligence would be the rich contextualization of information by brains in the construction of knowledge and meaning (Vitiello, 2009; Freeman et al., 2012 ).
Vitiello's dissipative quantum brain must be praised for many reasons. QM can help us to understand the long range functional integration of neurons that takes place in the brain. Macroscopic quantum features arise, in the classical limit, from the QFT treatment of the brain. Moreover, he considers the deepthinking consequences of his model, entering the philosophical discussion. In particular, one especially suggestive point is his insight about the role of the environment objectiveness in the appearance of consciousness, which should no longer be considered in isolation. Nonetheless, Vitiello's consciousness emerges as a manifestation of the dissipative quantum dynamics of the brain (Vitiello, 1995) . That is the reason why consciousness is not primary, but derived from physical interactions. Obviously, the model still suffers from the basic problem of specifically understanding this emergence, wherein the QM influence is present but somehow smeared out in the different physical scales. And yet, the problem of a non-consistent distinction between mental and material states is even more relevant, which implies the reducibility of mental activity to brain activity as an underlying assumption (Atmanspacher, 2011) . For Vitiello, the continual reshaping and rearrangement of the attractor landscapes, due to the introduction of new vacuum condensates triggered by forthcoming stimuli, constitutes the "contextualization" process by which, by differentiation with preexisting landscape arrangement, a meaning is attached to a specific stimulus (Vitiello, 2009 ). But he is simply offering the dynamic physical basis to which a "meaning" can be attached. Lack of clear distinction between mental and material is conducive to an ongoing and unauthorized passage from the scientific (objective) account to the first-person (subjective) account.
Top-down quantum-consciousness theories
Top-down quantum-consciousness models judge that mind is a primary reality, with manifestations in the physical world described by QM. In this subsection, we shall review the most prominent approaches under active consideration.
Beck-Eccles' Quantum Trigger at the Synaptic Cleft
Probably the most concrete hypothesis of how QM can play a role in brain processes is due to Beck and Eccles (1992; Beck, 2008a; 2008b) . It refers to particular mechanisms of information transfer at the synaptic cleft, wherein quantum processes would be relevant for exocytosis and, moreover, related to states of consciousness. Synapses are very different from simple on/off switches of computing devices and, whatever turns out to be the NCC, whether the entire brain or some subsystem thereof, neurosciences tell us that the points where it can be most easily affected are the synaptic junctions between neurons (Smith, 2009; Atmanspacher, 2011) . Beck-Eccles' proposal has been lately enriched by new hypotheses on the quantum mechanism triggering exocytosis (Vannini, 2008) .
According to Beck-Eccles' theory, preparation for exocytosis means bringing the paracrystalline presynaptic vesicular grid into a metastable state from which exocytosis can take place. The trigger mechanism is then modeled by quantum tunneling of a quasiparticle with one degree of freedom over an activation barrier. So, the model introduces into the activity of the neocortex an indeterministic selection of events controlled by the quantum probability amplitude: mental intentions (volitions) would become neurally effective by momentarily increasing the probability of vesicular emission in the thousands of synapses eISSN 1303-5150 www.neuroquantology.com 84 on each pyramidal cell. Afterwards, the coherent coupling of a large number of individual amplitudes of thousands of buttons in a dendron would lead to an overwhelming variety of actualities, or modes, in brain activity (Beck & Eccles, 1992) .
"Psychons" would be units of consciousness that connect together in order to produce a unitary experience; the mind being a non-material, quantum field of probability for Beck-Eccles (Vannini, 2008; Conte, 2008; Conte et al., 2009) . However, even though quantum effects of the type suggested by this theory could be at work here, it seems unlikely to most qualified neuroscientists that they could decisively influence the opening of fusion pores and the consequent secretion of neurotransmitters by presynaptic terminals. In addition, there remains the problem of how processes at single synapses could be correlated to mental activity whose neural correlates, as far as we know, are coherent assemblies of neurons. This has led to some criticism of BeckEccles' theory as an updated version of Descartes' pineal neuropsychology (Smith, 2001) . Be this as it may, the precise details of the exocytotic release of neurotransmitters into the synaptic cleft are only imperfectly understood at the time of writing (Smith, 2009) , and the question remains how the quantum trigger for exocytosis may be relevant for conscious mental states (Atmanspacher, 2011) .
Stapp's Quantum Zeno Effect
While most scientists affirm that we have presently no candidate theory to answer the problem of consciousness, Stapp claims that we do indeed (Stapp, 1996; 2005; 2007; Schwartz et al., 2005) . He does not suggest any modifications to QM but adds major interpretational extensions with respect to a detailed ontological framework (Atmanspacher, 2011) . For Stapp, nothing is lost by switching to quantum theory but a lot is gained: Psychology and psychiatry gain the possibility of reconciling with neuroscience the essential psychological concept of the ability of our minds to guide our actions; psycho-physics gains a dynamic model for the interaction of mind and brain; and philosophy of mind is liberated from the dilemma of having to choosing between identity theory and the emergence of a causally inert mind (Stapp, 2001) .
Within the von Neumann framework, the intervention by the observer into the physical brain dynamics and its accord with the person's conscious intent could be explained by the quantum Zeno effect (QZE): if a sequence of very similar probing actions (agent's conscious choices of measurements) occur in sufficiently rapid succession, then the affected component of the physical state will be forced to be exactly the sequence of states specified by the expected outcomes of the choices of measurements (Stapp, 2007; . The QZE merely keeps the state of the brain in the subspace where attention is focused on pursuing the plan of action specified by the chosen question (Stapp, 2001 ). Thanks to QZE, a "template for action" emerges as a pattern of physical (brain) activity which, if held in place for a sufficiently long time, will tend to cause the specific action to ensue.
In seriously considering QM from the perspective of standard Copenhagen interpretation, Stapp's model should be praised for underlying the necessity of invoking the first-person account in order to accomplish a measurement (even in neurosciences). QM randomness is avoided in human brain and actions via a QZE-based learning process. From the physical point of view, though, it is highly controversial to assume that the timing of our conscious efforts is compatible with very short decoherence times (see discussion in the next Section) and decoherence may be neglected. On the other hand, the question of learning should be tackled with more realistic models. In particular, the criteria about what should be initially considered a positive (expected) outcome and how and why the agent should change her/his freely-chosen probing action until the psycho-physical matching is achieved remain unclear.
From a philosophical perspective, besides the reduction of free will to mental attention in Stapp's proposal, the problem of "representation" stays behind the substitution of the notion of causal interaction by the notion of a constraint set by mind-matter correlations (Atmanspacher, 2011) , in a sort of "occasionalism". According to Stapp, the point at stake is not bringing the mental causes fully into the physical world but rather bringing only the effects of mental causes into it (Stapp 2008 Because of that, Stapp will hardly dodge the criticisms that he has become an idealist (Vannini, 2008) . While it remains far from obvious how conscious observation, in collapsing the wave-function, is able to determine which of the many superpositions is realized (Smith, 2009) , the toughest problem is that Stapp's model possesses the same interpretation gap as the Copenhagen interpretation of QM.
Manousakis' primary ontological character of consciousness
In initial agreement with Stapp's viewpoint (Stapp, 2007) , Manousakis' work on the mindbrain problem implies a deeper reinterpretation of von Neumann's quantum theory of measurement, stemming from more general philosophical ideas (Manousakis, 2006; . According to his postulated ontology, consciousness is not only a key ingredient for QM, but QM itself is founded on the framework of the operation and on the primary ontological character of consciousness. The activities of our body/brain are consequences of conscious events because the potential consciousness and the actor or the operation of consciousness are primary entities, whilst the streams of conscious events are emergent. Consciousness would be the ultimate judge that simply makes the choices about what questions to ask. Through such choices the universe evolves in a direction prepared by the sequence of all these events in consciousness; this process requires the division of the universe into an observed part and into an observing instrument (Manousakis, 2006 ).
Manousakis'
primary ontological character of consciousness seems too radical. While it could initially solve issues like the binding problem (Manousakis, 2006) , it gives too much prominence to conscious experience, adhering to QM as the natural theory for just describing what is observable in consciousness. In a sense-as in Stapp's case-this theory is the quantum parallel of the Bayesian brain approach in cognitive science, which allows for a cascade of top-down processing to generate low-level states from high-level causes thanks to a variety of learnt or innate ideas ("hyperpriors") concerning the general nature of the world (Clark, 2013) . Nevertheless, treating non-conscious reality as a mere potentiality of consciousness means paying a high price regarding the ontology of the wavefunction and the quantum state, for distinct quantum states must correspond to physically distinct states of reality (Pusey et al., 2012) .
Although
Manousakis rightly emphasizes the role of the conscious subject as the condition of possibility of doing science-his theory aims to describe the dynamics of the mental experience as communicated by the observer himself (Manousakis, 2009 )-it is dubious that all conscious experiences can be reduced to his schema, in which little room is left to explain how the outer world modifies conscious states. As neuroscience shows, there are some physical events that impose themselves on consciousness; he needs then to invoke a Universal Consciousness (Manousakis, 2006) that governs the world in a sort of preestablished harmony between individual consciousness and its neural correlate. Far from giving an answer to the mind-brain problem, Manousakis shares with Stapp the lack of interpretation of the measurement paradox as the main drawback of his approach.
Main criticisms of the relevance of QM in the brain
Mainstream critiques about the importance of QM in the physics of the brain stem from the experimental field. The basic claim is that no experiment has been presented hitherto showing unequivocal signs of quantum traces in the brain. Up to now, the classical argumentation of QM defenders is that quantum models fit experimental results better than ad-hoc classical models. For instance, there seems to be evidence emerging from studies of ion conducting proteins that point to the necessity to involve quantum effects in the description of transmembrane ion permeation. Quantum entanglement effects within a single ion conducting channel could lead to different rates of ion transfer through the channel and to deviations regarding classical predictions. While decoherence is still at play, thermodynamic averaging over all quantum possibilities does not necessarily converge into eISSN 1303-5150 www.neuroquantology.com the classical case, and quantum entanglement could be responsible for observable effects on the shape of neuronal action potentials (Naundorf et al., 2006 ). Yet the proposed quantum model assumes very few degrees of freedom and only two possible states for each one of them, and is thus too simplistic at present.
There are some promising results, which are not yet well-established, concerning quantum effects in microtubules (as suggested by Hameroff-Penrose) . On the one hand, the biochemical basis of depression might be correlated with the quantum cytoskeleton nanowire network (Pregnolato, 2010) ; on the other hand, the electronic conductance of microtubules assembled from porcine brain tubulin seems to show ballistic behavior along different, discrete helical pathways in single microtubules. If confirmed, such findings would demonstrate OOR to be biologically feasible (Penrose & Hameroff, 2011) . As well, Freeman claims that spectral analysis of electrocorticograms shows the occurrence of a powerlaw form of the temporal spectral density in loglog coordinates, which would indicate that the activity is scale-free. The large distances across which coherent oscillations are observed to occur in the brain would be accounted for by the long range of the correlation, extending to the whole system volume as a consequence of the spontaneous breakdown of symmetry in Vitiello's dissipative quantum brain (Freeman et al., 2011) .
However, the more active field of experimental research into quantum traces is the arena of binocular rivalry. This well-known phenomenon in visual perception turns out to be a powerful tool for studying the neural correlates of conscious visual experience, since the incoming signals remain constant while the percept switches to and fro between alternative representations (Conte, 2008; Conte et al., 2009; Clark, 2013) . Conte affirms that the results obtained after long experimentation confirmed that mental states follow QM during perception and cognition of ambiguous figures and also in the condition of semantic conflict. Violation of the classical Bayes formula for total probability, appearance of the conjunction fallacy and the need to introduce quantum interference would occur in these experiments, which do not deal with the physical processes actually taking place inside the brain. According to Conte's group, instead of operating with probabilities of various alternatives, the brain works directly with mental wave-functions. Although QM is not the only theory for explaining the brain complexity, any reductionist approach neglecting QM would be excluded by their results (Conte, 2008; Conte et al., 2009) . Even Bell's inequalities are expected to be violated in the case of experiments based on mental states during perception and cognition of ambiguous figures.
Manousakis' broader framework to integrate subjective experience and objective results is also used to describe the probability distribution of dominance duration obtained from the testimony of subjects experiencing binocular rivalry. Within the formalism of a simple two state system, his theory explains an observed marked increase in dominance duration in binocular rivalry upon periodic interruption of stimulus, and yields testable predictions for the distribution of perceptual alteration in time. This depends on the fact that Manousakis' theory places the attention of consciousness higher, in the hierarchy of consciousness, than the two stimulated neural correlates in the brain. In a similar way, instructing the observer to pay attention to one particular perceptual state influences and modulates the frequency of measurements, and when the stimulus on one eye is strengthened, the mean dominance duration of the other (unaffected) eye decreases. The model presents some differences regarding similar work by Atmanspacher, and is more successful in reproducing some experimental aspects (Manousakis, 2009; Pothos & Busemeyer, 2012) .
Nonetheless, even Manousakis acknowledges that quantum models for binocular rivalry can be complementary to models of classical neuroscience at most (Manousakis 2009 ). Right now, no experiment is able to validate a specific prediction of QM for the brain, since the reported agreement between the measured time evolution of conscious states during binocular rivalry and predictions derived from quantum formalism does not necessarily require any direct QM effect. The recursive consumption analysis process in the Ouroboros model can produce the same behavior, arising from macroscopic and classical features of diverse neurons and their connections. Classical and macroscopic systems can embody algorithms which appear to mimic QM effects and thus can be described to some extent using the same formalism (Thomsen, 2008) . Overall, current scientific understanding of diverse aspects of perception and action works in terms of conventional neuronal processing, because synaptic and spiking processes should destroy quantum coherence (Koch & Hepp, 2006) .
At the beginning of the century, Max Tegmark carried out theoretical estimates of decoherence time in the brain ranging from 10 -20 to 10 -13 s. He concluded that even if there is a so far undiscovered physical process in a brain's subsystem with a very long decoherence time, as soon as such a quantum subsystem communicates with the constantly decohering neurons to create conscious experience, everything decoheres. Therefore, consciousness itself could not be of a quantum nature (Tegmark, 2000) . Tegmark's estimates have been criticized along the last decade for a number of reasons: they do not address the temperature dependence of decoherence times correctly (Hagan et al., 2002; Salari et al., 2011) ; they assume a wrong separation length of tubulin dimer states, underestimating decoherence time by 7 orders of magnitude (Hagan et al., 2002; Penrose & Hameroff, 2011) ; they do not take into account possible recoherence mechanisms (Hartmann et al., 2006; Li & Paraoanu, 2009 ) and topological quantum effects (Penrose & Hameroff, 2011) ; they neglect dielectric permittivity, Debye layers and the ordering of water around microtubule bundles, thanks to actin gelation, which can enhance the decoherence time to 10 -2 or 10 -1 s. (Hagan et al., 2002; Abbott et al., 2008) . Some authors have even pointed out that, according to Tegmark's very short estimate of decoherence time, there would be no possibility for the formation of some crystals to occur, which of course contradicts the common experience. All these inconsistencies might signal not the approach to the classical regime, but the approach to the QFT regime (Alfinito et al., 2001) and to Vitiello's model of a dissipative quantum brain, due to the limit of applicability of QM in favor of QFT.
More specific criticisms of the feasibility of Hameroff-Penrose's OOR in the brain come from Reimers and McKemmish's group. No mechanical source of energy could be enough for the production of a strong coherent Fröhlich condensate-as required by OOR-in biological media McKemmish et al., 2009) . However, this viewpoint has been contested (Salari et al., 2011) . London forces between the electron cloud dipole states in tubulins would be sufficient for quantum superposition, without the need for GTP hydrolysis or significant conformational changes (Penrose & Hameroff, 2011) . Penrose and Hameroff have also answered specific criticisms by Grush and Churchland (Grush & Churchland, 1995 ), Tuszyński's group (Tuszyński et al., 1998) , and Koch and Hepp (Koch & Hepp, 2006) whose criticism of the QM interpretation of bistable perception would only apply to strictly Copenhagen adherents, but not to the OOR schema (Penrose & Hameroff, 2011) .
QM hypotheses for the brain are also criticized due to lack of correlation with the distinct regional architecture and function of the brain. They appear as disconnected from the rest of its machinery. The precise mechanisms by which QM phenomena interact with specific brain regions to generate cognition, free will and consciousness would have not been precisely defined, and, consequently, would not be amenable yet to experimental testing (Kuljiš, 2010) . The challenging question is whether and how the initial quantum properties extend into the functional domain of the emerging classical systems (Salari et al., 2011) . Because of this, the view of QM opponents can be summarized as follows: it does not supply us with any qualitatively new insights and concepts for the mechanisms studied by biological physics, nor for the hard problem; indeed, the apparently promising experimental results cited by QM defenders would be well understood from the point of view of standard classical physics (Abbott et al., 2008) .
That being said, recent empirical observations have begun to give more support to the relevance of QM in biological systems. The initial difficulties when considering QM in the brain, namely, too high a temperature, the large size of biomolecules and the noisy environment, fade out in front of quantum effects occurring at room temperature-and at even higher temperatures in inert materials (Ghosh et al., 2003) -and the observation of macroscopic quantum effects (Kuljiš, 2010; Salari et al., 2011) . Researchers are now realizing how general and robust quantum entanglement is: it can be found in macroscopic systems, can persist in the thermodynamic limit at arbitrarily high temperatures, and turns out to be crucial for explaining the behavior of large systems (Vedral, 2008) . Under some specific conditions, it can also be maintained at long time-scales (Li & Paraoanu, 2009 ). Then, criticisms about the relevance of QM in biology seem to be less convincing in the presence of existing evidence for quantum effects in biological systems (Salari et al., 2011) : longlived quantum coherent states at body temperature in photosynthesis (Kauffman, 2008) , as shown by transfer energy according to QM probability facilitating the efficient lightharvesting by cryptophyte marine algae under biologically relevant conditions (Collini et al., 2010) .
All told, we do not yet have a definite answer to the question about the empirical relevance of QM in the brain. Even defenders of QM like Kaufmann sum up the situation by saying that the scientific grounds for a quantum mind are presently weak; that it is, at present, an improbable scientific hypothesis, but that it can definitely not be ruled out (Kauffman, 2009 ). There is a lack of experimental evidence and none of the current QM proposals for the brain seem to have neurobiological plausibility; though, at the same time, pre-QM science alone is not adequate to tackle the mind-brain problem (Smith, 2009 ). All these considerations naturally introduce the necessity of a closer philosophical look at the problem of decoherence, as the physical process that seemingly allows the transition from the quantum to the classical regime.
The problem of decoherence
Quantum decoherence is currently the favorite model to explain passage from the quantum world of possibilities to the classical world of actual events (Zurek, 2002) . Decoherence theory states that whenever a quantum system interacts with a large enough environmentwhich can be modeled as a huge set of quantum oscillators (Caldeira & Leggett, 1983a; 1983b) the system's phase information becomes scrambled because of quantum entanglement with the environment. Quantum coherence cannot occur in the system because of this loss of phase information, and the classical regimesome actual physical event-emerges from the "fog" of propagating possibilities (Kauffman, 2008) . Interaction of the quantum system with its environment somehow acts like a classical measuring device in the Copenhagen interpretation. The system is "partially measured" by its environment, hence the gradual onset of decoherence leading the system into a classical mixed state of classical probabilities, not quantum probabilities that superimpose (Kauffman, 2009 ). The existence of decoherence is well established experimentally and in fact is the greatest difficulty to overcome if we wish to build quantum computers. Furthermore, it would be the main factor responsible for the lack of QM prominence in the brain, which would always act as decoherent environment for the subsystems involved in phenomena of consciousness.
Nevertheless, how decoherence actually occurs in different physical or biological systems is only understood to some extent. This understanding is on the limits of current physics (Kauffman, 2008) . On the one hand, as already mentioned, decoherence does not necessarily signal the approach to the classical regime; it may also signal the approach to the QFT regime. One must carefully consider the physics of the system under study in order to correctly conclude about the implications of decoherence (Alfinito et al., 2001) . On the other hand, as Zeilinger points out, decoherence gets rid of the quantum interference terms but it does not explain why a specific event comes to happen (Abbott et al., 2008) . In other words, what we may perceive is different depending on the presence or not of decoherence, but decoherence only destroys quantum entanglement, not the probabilistic character of the theory; the probabilistic interpretation remains-at least at this basic level of description. For this reason, some scholars argue that quantum indeterminacies cannot be completely eliminated in all cases. Some of the microscopic quantum indeterminacy must at least occasionally make its way up to the macroscopic level (Stapp, 2008 (Sols, 2014) .
Penrose has carried out a deeper discussion on the problems of decoherence as a complete explanation of the crossover from QM to classical physics (Penrose, 2004) . Irrespective of his own position regarding the role of QM in the mind-brain problem, Penrose shows that decoherence does not provide a consistent ontology for the reality of the world, merely offering a pragmatic procedure "for all practical purposes" (FAPP). Decoherence is representation-dependent; the final reduced density matrix is diagonal in a given basis but, unless it turns out to be the identity (which means we know nothing), it will be nondiagonal in other basis sets. Moreover, it does not address the issue of how the wave-function collapse might arise in isolated systems, nor the nature of isolation in which an external environment is not involved, nor does it tell us which part of a system is to be regarded as the "environment" part, and it provides no limit to the size of that part which can remain subject to quantum coherence (Penrose & Hameroff, 2011) . It is then fair to say that decoherence theory does not solve any of these problems, and the following important question remains: What is the meaning of classicality when a large or complex system (as the brain) collapses to become a classical entity while its components (atoms or molecules) are still quantum mechanical? (Salari et al., 2011) .
While scientists may not go further in this problem, philosophers of science should draw some conclusions that some neuroscientists do not wish to considerlimiting themselves to the empirical evidence. Even though it is true that we do not possess conclusive evidence on the relevance of QM in the brain, mere reference to classical complexity as a would-be explanation for consciousness leads to a philosophical conundrum. Since QM is the underlying basic physical theory wherein classical behavior is retrieved thanks to decoherence, decoherence itself should be understood in QM terms. However, for the process to work properly, we need to invoke an a priori different treatment of parts within the system. This must be split into a subsystem and a thermal bath (a mathematical idealization of the environment) whose degrees of freedom are averaged out. So, we need to invoke a different, ad-hoc treatment of a part of the physical system. In this sense, decoherence as an explanation of the emergence of classicality in the brain-and eventually complexity-mediated consciousness-is a dualistic and incomplete theory.
Consequently, the arguments of any mind-classical-brain identity theory defenders, relying on decoherence to get rid of QM, turn out to be flawed. There is lack of correspondence between emergent reality via decoherence and fundamental determinism and, on the other hand, the classical limit is obtained for the relevant subsystem after having surreptitiously introduced the classical limit in the concept of thermal bath. This becomes a circular argument in order to explain the emergence of the classical level. It is only FAPP useful-as Penrose rightly points out. People that consider QM irrelevant for the brain are perhaps viewing things from a perspective that is too one-sided. The problem is not simply whether QM is relevant for the physics of consciousness; it is that fundamental considerations based on physics (in particular the physics of the brain) cannot be made without QM, which is intrinsically dualistic. Now, it is remarkable that decoherence exists when a physical system is a priori defined to get information from it via some sort of "measurement". In other words, the irreducible decision regarding the system to be studied and the observation to be made is part of the process. We must a priori decide what physical subsystem is going to be relevant and what it is going to be like, because the model of decoherence implies the observer's selection of subsystems. So, we cannot even dream of explaining consciousness via decoherence without previously introducing conscious decisions on how the system must be studied.
As Paul Davies puts it, we are still left with the issue that QM is incomplete inasmuch as it gives a probabilistic description of the world and the actual outcome of any given observation clearly depends on the observer (Abbott et al., 2008) , either by itself or by a measurement device created by her/himself. All of which obviously does not mean that reality is a sheer creation of consciousness, but consciousness is needed for our perception of even the slightest element of common objective reality. So, when all is said and done, the remaining possibilities for current mind-brain research are: (1) either consciousness itself activates decoherence, being a non-physically derived reality, in accordance with top-down quantum-consciousness theories (subsection 3.2); (2) or consciousness is the product of subtler physical processes, which are not yet well understood, in line with bottom-up quantum-consciousness models (subsection 3.1). Progress in the field will possibly favor one of these two possibilities, but we can affirm that current standard physical theory rules out any sort of mind-classical-brain identity theory. Whatever progress might eventually be achieved on the mind-brain problem, it will remain tightly closed to the QM measurement paradox.
Philosophical remarks
There seems to be a misleading perspective when the relationship between QM and the mind-brain problem is only judged on empirical grounds, as many defenders of the mind-brain identity theory do. While that attitude may be legitimate from a strictly scientific viewpoint requiring unambiguous experiential supportsee, e.g., (Koch & Hepp, 2006; Thomsen, 2008) -it is simply unfair to consider models based on QM Copenhagen interpretation as loaded with mysticism or panpsychism (Vannini, 2008) . Instead, merely instrumental visions cautiously avoid the issue of how the fundamental QM nature of reality becomes classical at the (alleged) relevant physical brain scales for consciousness. However, this question is inescapable if "all biological organisms must obey the laws of physics, both classical and quantum" (Koch & Hepp, 2006) , and most classical neuroscientists assume that decoherence is enough for the appearance of the classical world, ignoring its profound epistemic requirements. Therefore, reflections from the field of philosophy of science may help scientists to understand the limits of scientific theories and determine where to address creative efforts to solve actual conundrums.
Alternatively, some attempts to detach consciousness from QM are based on the wellknown fact that the existence of interference patterns for the system's relevant degrees of freedom depends on whether the "which-path" information is in principle obtainable, irrespective of its registration in the consciousness of a human observer. For this reason, consciousness would not play a vital role in the measuring procedure, and QM would not assign the human observer a more special role than she/he has been assigned by the classical theory. Yu and Nikolić claim that "having these two deep mysteries [consciousness and QM] disentangled one from the other might be an important step forward towards understanding each of them" (Yu & Nikolić, 2011 ). Yet, while their interpretation seems to rule out the connection between wavefunction collapse and actual consciousness, the subtle links of decoherence with consciousness need not be definitely wiped out in this manner. There could be prior correlations between consciousness and the measuring devices for the designed experiment, the mere possibility of knowing the results triggering decoherence. As Manousakis stresses, we construct instruments to measure quantities based on our known concepts and therefore they do not have the capability to measure a quantity unknown to us. A particular observation site of consciousness is realized when the totality is divided into an observing instrument and the rest which plays the role of the observed. A particular measurement consists of a question that consciousness has decided to ask (Manousakis, 2006) . Obviously, the link between QM and consciousness is far from resolved. In any case, what current fundamental physics shows us is that causal closure in physical systems, particularly in the brain, is presently untenable. The fact that choices made by human observers are, in current QM, not determined by the physical state of the universe means the failure of one of the chief properties of classical scientific theories and the insufficiency of the neurological state of the brain to determine future behavior (Stapp, 2008) . This raises the question of true downward causation in nature. As Kauffman notes, it is critical that we have here a process that is partially lawless, yet also is not random. We are no longer trapped by deterministic efficient cause law, including deterministic chaos, versus merely random probabilistic views of mind and brain. So there seems to be an alternative way between pure determinism and pure randomness. Even if decoherence is invoked, there is no a priori law in detail for it. Up to now, quantum uncertainty and decoherence have apparently shown an intrinsic limit of a law-like scientific knowledge and this seems to imply that the quantum measurement problem is insoluble (Kauffman, 2009) . It is also noteworthy-out of the QM context-that strong effects of top-down expectation have also recently been demonstrated for conscious recognition, raising important questions about the very idea of any simple, context independent NCC (Clark, 2013) .
The notion of downward causation is used to depict the idea that higher-level properties influence lower-level ones, and this naturally introduces the topic about the existence and description of diverse levels in the brain. Atmanspacher and Rotter have outlined different kinds of neurodynamics covering the full range between purely stochastic and purely deterministic descriptions. Moving from microscopic (sub-cellular, membrane-bound molecules) to mesoscopic (neuronal assemblies) and macroscopic (large networks or populations of neurons) levels, completely different kinds of deterministic and stochastic models are suitable and relevant for the description. Furthermore, there is no clear-cut way to decide whether neurodynamics is deterministic or stochastic; there are no universal rules to determine how these descriptions vary as one goes through levels. Even worse, stochastic and deterministic descriptions can mathematically be transformed into each other. So the intricate relations between determinacy and stochasticity raise grave doubts concerning the hope of inferring ontologically valid statements from neurodynamic descriptions. In addition, a strict reduction of higher to lower levels of description fails in this context. Lower-level description provides necessary, but not sufficient conditions for higher-level descriptions. Thus, higher-level features are neither a logical consequence of the lower-level descriptions nor can they be rigorously derived from the lower-descriptions alone. However, sufficient conditions for a derivation of higherlevel features can be implemented by identifying higher-level contexts that reflect the particular kind of contingency in a given situation (Atmanspacher & Rotter, 2008) . This procedure cannot stem from the lower levels, remaining irreducible.
There is therefore irreducibility of higher-level contexts playing the role of constraints acting "downward". Neither bottom-up nor top-down versions of causation turn out to be sufficient to describe causality in the mind-brain problem. Correlations between brain and mind are uncontroversial, but to say which implies which is entirely hypothetical as long as the intended mode of causation remains unspecified and no theoretical background is available for the corresponding interpretation. In particular, the claim of an ontic determinism in neurodynamics cannot be defended on the basis of the currently established body of knowledge, and implications from it bear the risk of being fundamentally flawed. Reductionism is then not only simplistic but, as a rule, false. This becomes even more manifest if one goes from different levels of brain description to those of mind and behavior (Atmanspacher & Rotter, 2008) . Kuljiš has also pointed out the challenge, in terms of interdisciplinary integration towards a coherent understanding, implied by the wealth of information at many conceptually decoupled physical scales and domains in contemporary neurosciences. This unresolved task includes the QM brain hypothesis, because it represents the minimum level that needs to be considered for an integrative understanding of brain function (Kuljiš, 2010) .
All these reflections bring home the implicit need for a higher anthropological level when trying to understand physical reality and, in particular, the mind-brain relationship. The problem of consciousness is a manifestation of a more basic gnoseologic problem in current QM, which should be approached by paying attention to the underlying philosophical implications. Physical laws are quantum laws which, at some not entirely well-defined limit, become classical. So the inevitable question is how this occurs, even in the brain. Our specific claim is that, in order to address the issue; a higher anthropological level is needed at which the distinction between two different processes-with or without measurement-is meaningful.
The simple recourse to decoherence is irrelevant at this philosophical point of the discussion, since the definition of the subsystems must be done a priori, and cannot strictly be derived from the theory. In that sense, the introduction of a thermal bath for the occurrence of decoherence is akin to the introduction of the Second Law of Thermodynamics, wherein-according to the standard Boltzmann interpretation of entropyan anthropological distinction between microstates and macrostates is a priori done because of the anthropological relevance of some quantities. In other words, for cognitively approaching physical reality, in particular the physical reality of the brain, the labor of this higher anthropologic level is required. It is not derivable from any scientific law, but a condition of possibility of the scientific work itself. We average the thermal bath's degrees of freedom out because we do not know how to QM deal with the whole system, but we do know the type of information that is being looked for in it. The anthropologic level, like any other non-reducible level, introduces novelty in the world by interpreting physics as informative real knowledge. As far as we know, the conscious perceiver provides the highest level of eISSN 1303-5150 www.neuroquantology.com 92 information processing in the world. It introduces specific constraints that allow for unambiguous crossovers from lower to upper levels.
Consciousness introduces human-like information in the world that is stored in the evolving objective quantum states of the universe, in accordance with the laws of QM. Consciousness does not create reality, but determines reality up to a point. It allows for deeper knowledge of a reality consisting of different levels, with different epistemic properties, which can be only known by a being of similar epistemic power. A number of scientists claim that classical complexity should account for the emergence of phenomena like thoughts and freedom (Tegmark, 2000) , but what does complexity add? It is necessary to look at the right level to discover selforganization of matter or self-organized criticality (Kauffman, 1993; 2000) . Complexity language in itself is not different from statistical physics language. However, it is its interpretation-mediated by the anthropologic level-that may eventually add something more. Such an interpretation is strictly nonmaterialistic. There is no interpretation in purely material nature (Searle, 1997) . In this sense, human consciousness and science are absolutely related, the latter being a different exploration of reality than that held by nonhuman animals or by inert beings. As Hagan rightly remarks, by treating the phenomenon of consciousness or the subject as merely another object under study, no explanation is given as to why these degrees of freedom in particular should have subjective implications or how they come to be associated with one another in a manner that does not depend on the arbitrary assignment of an observer. Whereas the object is simply the name assigned to an arbitrarily delineated subsystem of the whole, the subject is not an arbitrary product of the way one happens to choose to analyze a system. The existence of an object of study is a relative fact, an artifact of analysis, whereas the existence of a subject is absolute, and its determination is a fact that is itself in need of explanation (Hagan et al., 2002) .
Perhaps, in the end, QM is in physics the analog of Gödel's theorems in mathematics. As Gödel's theorem shows that syntax cannot be separated from semantics, QM shows the limit after which the separation of nature and human access to it is no longer possible. In QM the logic, the cognition and the conceptual entitycognitive performance assume the same importance as the features of what is being described. We are at levels of reality where the truths of logical statements about dynamic variables become dynamic variables themselves so that a deep link is established from the start in this theory between physics and conceptual entities (Bohm, 1990; Smith, 2009) . It must therefore be stressed that the QM philosophical framework is relevant not because it provides randomness-as opposed to being deterministic-but because it posits the nonreducible influence of the conscious firstperson account to describe physical reality.
Conclusions
In this article we have shown that current QM reveals our inability to understand human consciousness from a purely objective approach. Apart from other well-known problems, conventional mind-brain identity theories draw heavily upon the process of decoherence for the transition from the quantum to the classical world. However, we have specifically explained how the theoretical implementation of that process requires a subjective choice of the subsystem whose degrees of freedom are to be suppressed. As a consequence, mind-brain identity theories resting upon decoherence are fundamentally flawed, hiding in their foundations what they try to explain away.
Current models involving QM in the conscious brain have also been reviewed. Some of them simply apply the QM formalism and do not enter into the scientific discussion of consciousness.
Bottom-up quantum consciousness-theories consider consciousness as an emergent property of quantum nature, still to be determined. Top-down quantumconsciousness theories tend to be dualist, claiming a primary role of consciousness in nature with an undetermined way of interaction. Up to now, experimental tests have been inexistent or, at most, inconclusive, the binocular rivalry perception being one of the most promising fields in this regard.
In spite of this inconclusive situation, what QM models have in common concerning the conscious brain is the realization that the measurement problem of QM is profoundly linked with the hard problem of consciousness. It is highly unlikely that we will solve one problem without solving the other. Against the literature that presents this link as an instance of the fallacy "I don 't understand A, I don't understand B, A and B must 
